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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
in the instant case for there are no disputed facts.3 4 The claimant has possession
of the appellant's check. The State admittedly owes the claimant the sum de-
manded, and thus the purpose of the statute of limitations is not being erved.
On the other hand, the purpose of the constitutional provision limiting claims to
those which would not be barred if occurring between private citizens is to prevent
grossly unjust claims from being allowed by a special act of the Legislature. 3
In the instant case, there is no reason to believe that this is such a claim. The
contract was faithfully performed by claimant for his work. The Court's decision,
then, does not appear to follow the spirit of either the statute of limitations or
the constitutional provision. To hold otherwise, however, the Court would have
had to disregard the clear mandate of both.
George P. Doyle
CRIMINAL LAW-INCULPATORY STATEMENTS GIVEN BEFORE ARRAIGN-
MENT WHERE CONSULTATION WITH COUNSEL REFUSED, Now INADMISSABLE.
Defendant Donovan was arrested as a suspect in connection with the killing
of a guard shot during a payroll robbery. The arrest was accomplished at about
7:30 p.m. on Thursday, May 11, 1961.1 Defendant was thereafter questioned
continuously until 3:00 a.m. of May 12.2 Interrogation was resumed later the
same morning, and, at 10:00 a.m., Donovan admitted complicity in the crime.3
In mid-afternoon of the same day, counsel retained by defendant's family
requested access to the defendant but was turned away by the officers in charge.
4
On the heels of this incident, an assistant district attorney conducted a question
and answer session with the defendant.3 This conversation yielded a lengthy
inculpatory statement which the defendant signed in the closing hours of the
day.6 On the morning of May 13, approximately one and one half days after
arrest, defendant was arraigned. All evidence acquired during this period, includ-
ing defendant's written statement, was admitted at trial. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty against Donovan and one co-defendant without recommenda-
tion of leniency.7 Both defendants were then sentenced to death. On direct appeal
to the Court of Appeals, held, reversed, with three judges joining in the majority
opinion, one concurring and three dissenting. Under the New York Constitution,
both the provision assuring right to counsel and the guarantee of due process,
require exclusion of inculpatory statements given by the accused during informal,
pre-arraignment proceedings if, prior to the time the damaging statement was
34. Instant case at 510, 191 N.E.2d at 456, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
35. Cayuga County v. State, 153 N.Y. 279, 47 N.E. 288 (1897).
1. Record, vol. 1, pp. 179-80.
2. Record, vol. 2, p. 992.
3. Record, vol. 1, pp. 233-39.
4. Record, vol. 2, pp. 1017-18.
5. Record, vol. 2, p. 787.
6. Record, vol. 2, pp. 790-91.
7. Record, vol. 1, pp. 15-16.
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given, consultation with counsel has been refused either to the accused or to the
attorney himself. 8 People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
In this case, and in several recent related decisions, the Court of Appeals
has sought to develop standards which will minimize the impairment of a de-
fendant's constitutional safeguards at trial through informal and frequently
unconscionable methods of pre-trial interrogation.9 The rights impaired are said
to be those of due process, 10 right to counsel," and freedom from "testimonial
compulsion."'1 2 Changes in the law have deliberately implemented the rule which
long stood in both the New York and federal jurisdictions, holding that state-
ments not voluntarily given are not admissable. 13 This rule has been supple-
mented in the federal jurisdiction by making inadmissable any statements,
regardless of voluntariness, if made by the defendant while illegally detained
(McNabb-Mallory rule).14 Detention becomes illegal, for purposes of this rule,
where there has been an unnecessary delay in arraignment. 15 Although the New
York Court of Appeals has expressed some sympathy for McNabb,1 the
majority has declined to accept the rule, preferring instead to let the jury treat
delay in arraignment as a factor affecting the voluntariness of the statement.'
7
This position is consistent with the requirements of due process under the four-
teenth amendment; 5 federal constitutional protection does not mandate an
acceptance of the higher standard expressed by the McNabb-Mallory rule.' 9
New York has also implemented the voluntariness rule, but it has chosen
to do so by extending an accused's right to counsel to post-arraignment,2 0 and
8. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
Note that the case is susceptible of a narrower holding since the relevant events occurred
after there had been an unreasonable delay in arraignment. The Court, however, would seem
to say that the right could inure from the moment of arrest.
9. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183
N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962); People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70
(1961) ; People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
10. Instant case at 151, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
11. Cases cited note 9 supra.
12. Ibid. "Testimonial compulsion" probably should be subsumed under due process, the
privilege against self-incrimination not extending beyond the witness stand. See 49 Cornell
L.Q. 146 n.7 (1963) ; 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 844 (3d ed. 1940).
13. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896); People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347,
179 N.E.2d 339, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961); People v. Mummiani, 258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94(1932).
14. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943); Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a); see N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 165; N.Y. Penal Law § 1844
(misdemeanor where police unnecessarily delay arraignment).
15. Mallory v. United States, supra note 14, at 453.
16. People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 354, 179 N.E.2d 339, 341, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197, 200
(1961) (concurring opinion).
17. People v. Lane, supra note 16; People v. Elnore, 277 N.Y. 397, 14 N.E.2d 451
(1938).
18. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1951); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
19. Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 508 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 US. 433,
439 n.4 (1958).
20. Cases cited note 9 supra.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
(through the instant case) to informal pre-arraignment proceedings. It was first
held, in a capital case, that post-arraignment questioning in the absence of
counsel was an unconstitutional denial of one's right to counsel.21 This holding
has since been extended to felony cases generally, 22 the rule now being more
fully articulated as follows: "It is the interrogation, in the absence of counsel,
after the criminal proceeding has been commenced, whether by grand jury indict-
ment or by a charge placed before a magistrate following an arrest, which is
forbidden. " 23 The federal courts have held that the requirement of due process
under the fourteenth amendment does not extend this far; 24 due process does
require a right to counsel at trial,25 but in pre-trial proceedings there is satisfac-
tion if the defendant is not "... so prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent
trial with an absence of . . 'fundamental fairness' . .,.-2 Pre-trial denial of
counsel may, however, for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, be relevant in
evaluating the voluntariness of a statement. 27
In the present case, a bare majority held that in pre-arraignment proceed-
ings, where conference with counsel has been refused, any inculpatory statements
thereafter made by the accused are not admissable. 28 Refusal of conference with
counsel arises either where the accused has requested and has been refused
counsel, or where an attorney retained on behalf of the accused has been denied
access to his client.20 It should be emphasized that the holding adverts repeatedly
to the fact that the inadmissable statements were made during a period of un-
lawful detention. Whether, however, the Court would require this additional
element as a prerequisite to right of counsel is not made explicit in the opinion.
It should further be noted that this holding does not extend the existing New
York post-arraignment rule (excluding statements made merely in the absence of
counsel) 30 to pre-arraignment proceedings. Three judges dissented separately,
agreeing with one another however, that evidence obtained under the circum-
stances of this case should be excluded only if involuntarily given.31 The dissent-
ing judges note in particular that the majority holding tends to favor those who,
21. People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.YS.2d 21 (1960).
22. People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
23. People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 284, 183 N.E.2d 651, 652, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353,
355 (1962).
24. Cases cited note 19 supra; United States ex rel. Morrison v. LaVallee, 206 F. Supp.
679 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
25. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954);
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
26. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958) (arrestee a former law student);
see Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). The New York Court of Appeals thus
holds that a denial of counsel in pre-trial proceedings is conclusive of consequent prejudice
at the trial.
27. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
28. Applying the holding to the facts, it is apparent that Donovan's oral admission of
complicity would be admissable, but that his signed statement would not be.
29. In this case the attorney requested an interview with the accused. Instant case at
151, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
30. People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962).
31. See People v. Noble, 9 N.Y.2d 571, 175 N.E.2d 451, 216 N.YS.2d 79 (1961).
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through some fortuity such as wealth, habitual contact with the law, or intelli-
gence, retain counsel either before or immediately after arrest.
The dissenting opinions unfortunately do not refer to one remarkably com-
pelling argument with which the Court was faced in this case: that is, had the
police officers not unlawfully delayed arraignment, 32 the conviction would have
been summarily reversed on the authority of the post-arraignment right-to-
counsel rule of People v. Meyer 33 This irony must have called irresistably for
reversal, but the Court, in so doing, has perhaps extended its ruling farther than
conscience required. It would be sufficient to confer a right of counsel only where
there has been an unlawful delay in arraignment.34 If the Court has indeed so
ruled, the conflict with efficient law enforcement which the dissenting judges
foresee in their more liberal interpretation of the case,35 would be moderated some.
Yet this narrower holding does not alter the tendency of the present rule to favor
persons with ready access to counsel over those with limited access. Said differ-
ently, the rule favors grand scale crime over petty crime, and this, of course, is an
undesirable result. The three possible defects of the present rule (inequality of
application, favoritism of large scale crime, and unnecessary interference with
law enforcement) should evoke some reconsideration.
James B. Denman
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY-PROCEEDS OF FIRE INSURANCE
POLICY ON REAL PROPERTY HELD BY THE ENTIRETY MAY BE DMDED AS OF
RIGHT.
Husband and wife were owners as tenants by the entirety of real property
with improvements thereon. A dwelling house, covered by a fire insurance policy
owned and held by them, was totally destroyed by fire. Upon execution of notice
of claim by the owners the insurance company issued a draft payable to hus-
band, wife, and another who was mortgagee of the property. Husband, who had
been separated from the wife for some time, refused to endorse the draft. Upon
wife's action for injunctive and other relief, husband moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the proceeds were impressed with the same quality of inseverability
as the estate they replaced. The Supreme Court granted the motion,' which
was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department. The
Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting without opinion, reversed; held, the
proceeds of a standard fire insurance are personal property which may be divided
upon demand regardless of the nature of the estate they replace. Hawthorne v.
Hawthorne, 13 N.Y.2d 82, 192 N.E.2d 20, 242 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1963).
32. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 165; N.Y. Penal Law § 1844.
33. 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962). See Brief for Appellant,
p. 37.
34. See note 28 supra.
35. Instant case at 159, 193 N.E.2d at 634, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
1. Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 24 Misc. 2d 508, 208 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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